COMPARED WITH other industrial countries, Japan imports an unusually small share of its domestic use of manufactured goods. In 1980, for example, imports accounted forjust 5.8 percent of Japanese expenditures on manufactured products, compared with 9.3 percent of U.S. expenditures. That same year, non-EC imports accounted for 13.9 percent of spending by the European Community. I Why Japan imports so little is a source of great controversy. Popular explanations stress the role of both official and unofficial import barriers. The Japanese government allegedly takes advantage of the openness of foreign markets while reserving local markets for domestic firms. It once implemented this mercantilist policy through formal protectionist measures such as tariffs and quotas. Today it uses administrative guidance, discriminatory standards and regulations, selective government procurement, the official organization of domestic firms into cartels, and weak enforcement of antitrust laws. Japanese imports are also discouraged by unofficial practices, such as the strong relationships ("invisible handshakes") between local suppliers and buyers, "just-in-time" inventory practices that give nearby suppliers an edge, and an unusually complex distribution system that creates substantial entry barriers for newcomers, whether Japanese or foreign
manufactured goods surpluses to offset deficits in primary commodities and services. In 1986, their manufacturing trade and current account balances were similar percentages of GDP. But the German example demonstrates that low levels of manufactured imports are not necessarily "required" in resource-poor countries. Despite manufactured goods imports of 14.2 percent of GDP, Germany has been able to run surpluses in its manufactured goods trade that were larger shares of GDP than those of Japan. The Heckscher-Ohlin theory assumes standardized products and predicts that countries will not import and export the same products, that is, that there will be no intra-industry trade. In terms of the theory, intra-industry trade is a statistical artifact resulting from insufficient disaggregation. Relying on this view, Saxonhouse has argued that his use of net exports as a dependent variable is permissible because his data are disaggregated. However, as reported in table 2, the Grubel-Lloyd index of intra-industry trade calculated using data on ninety-four manufacturing industries indicates that Japan is noteworthy for its lack of intra-industry trade even at the disaggregation level used by Saxonhouse. Table 3 further highlights the unusual nature of Japanese ratios of exports to imports. For eleven of the twenty-two categories (accounting for 48.4 percent of OECD manufactured goods trade), the Japanese ratios are far higher than those of any other country. The average industry ratio of Japanese exports to imports in 1980 was 7.6, compared with that of the next highest country, Finland, which, because of its high ratio in wood products, had an average ratio of 2.6.
Other authors have examined imports directly. C. Fred Bergsten and William Cline regress the ratio of aggregate imports of goods and nonfactor income services to GNP against income, population, resource endowments, and distance from trading partners.8 They find that the Japanese import ratio does not differ significantly from that of other countries in the sample, and they conclude that Japan does not have excessive trade protection.9 Bela Balassa, however, using a different specification of transportation costs and specifying the European coulitries separately, concludes that Japan is an "outlier" in both its manufacturing and total imports.10 The Cline-Bergsten and Balassa studies have been criticized by Saxonhouse and Marcus Noland for not being based on a clear theoretical foundation. 1I Apparently, in addition, the methodology yields results that are sensitive to minor changes in variable specification.
Noland has tried to remedy these shortcomings by using a theoretical model presented by Elhanan Helpman and Paul Krugman that explains the volume of trade and allows for intra-industry trade. 12 that Japanese aggregate exports, imports, and total trade are not out of the ordinary. Although Noland's work uses a more appropriate theoretical framework, he explains total merchandise trade volumes and provides no test of trade in manufactured products alone. 13 Because manufactured goods account for less than a third of Japanese imports, even substantial underimporting of manufactured goods is not likely to be detected in the aggregate specification. In sum, the behavior of Japanese manufactured goods imports has not been adequately explained. Although the accounts stressing import barriers and those stressing factor endowments are not mutually exclusive, a sense of the relative importance of each is essential for policymaking. If trade barriers are unimportant and Japan's low imports of manufactured goods are the inevitable result of its macroeconomic behavior and factor endowments, policymakers who commit themselves to raising imports through removal of trade barriers could be frustrated and disappointed. On the other hand, if import barriers are important, Japan's adjustment to recent changes in macroeconomic policy and exchange rates could occur predominantly in Japanese exports, and the Japanese market could remain relatively closed. If significant barriers are found, their nature needs to be determined. Are the barriers official or private? Are they like quotas, so that imports are unresponsive to price changes, or are they like tariffs, so that despite their presence, import volumes will respond to currency changes?
In this report I explore some of these questions. Using a model based on the theory of trade under imperfect competition, I demonstrate that Japanese manufactured imports are about 40 percent lower than one would expect of a typical industrial economy. If Japanese manufactured imports reflected more typical trade, Japan's manufactured goods trade surplus would be only about 16 percent smaller, but Japan would have considerably more intra-industry trade.
The model leaves certain questions unanswered. It cannot distinguish between the impact of Japanese barriers on foreign imports and that of foreign barriers on Japanese exports, nor can it differentiate between the effects of import barriers and the peculiar preferences of Japanese 13. Data constraints (Noland does not measure factor endowments such as human and physical capital explicitly) and the need to assume balanced trade-clearly violated in practice-may compromise Noland's conclusions. buyers. Because there were few export restraints on Japanese trade in early observation years of the data sample, results from these years provide measures of the impact of import barriers and unusual preferences.
In the second part of the paper I examine the price sensitivity of Japanese manufactured imports and find that, for many products, import price elasticities are as high as those in the United States. Japanese import barriers thus operate more like tariffs than like quotas and are probably due to unofficial practices based on unusual buyer preferences and monopolies in the distribution system rather than to officially implemented cartels or quantitative restraints. I conclude that these barriers will not, for the most part, prevent an import response to the stronger yen. Finally, I argue that Japan must take steps beyond the strong exchange rate to increase the openness of its markets.
Is Japanese Import Behavior Unusual? I will use a special case of a model developed by Helpman and Krugman to explain trade in differentiated products. The theory explains the volume of imports independent of comparative advantage. It predicts a relationship between the share of imports in domestic consumption and the share of home production in world production.
In the simplest version of the model, two countries of equal size, with identical factor endowments and access to the same technology, produce the same good: a differentiated product, produced in numerous varieties.'4 Each variety is produced with the same production function, which exhibits economies of scale. These scale economies are fairly small, however, so the industry accommodates many producers, each producing a different variety. In the long run, firms enter the market until each earns zero profits.'5 Consumers in both countries have similar 15. Ibid., p. 132. As Helpman and Krugman point out, "The industry [has] a market structure known as monopolistic competition; that is, every firm chooses a variety and pricing strategy so as to maximize profits, taking as given the variety choice and pricing strategy of the other producers in the industry. In this case every firm ends up producing a different variety of the product." tastes but a preference for variety. 16 There are no trade barriers and no transportation or other transactions costs. Trade is balanced. In equilibrium, there will be n firms of equal size in each country. With identical demand curves for each variety and cost functions for each firm, output and prices of each firm will be the same. Consumption patterns in each country will be identical, with domestic and foreign firms accounting for equal shares in the purchases of each consumer.
If country A doubles in size, A will produce 2n varieties; B, n varieties. Consumers in both countries will allocate two-thirds of their consumption to A goods and one-third to B goods. One-third of the production of A and two-thirds of the production of B will be exported. Similarly, imports will be one-third of consumption in A and two-thirds of consumption in B.
Thus, in this frictionless model, a country's share in both national markets will be proportional to its share in world production. As Helpman observes, relative country size is the determinant of trade when all products are differentiated.'7 The larger the country's share in world production, the larger its share in its home market and thus the smaller exports or imports as a share of GNP.
What happens in this model if trade is not balanced? Assume, for example, that the economies are of equal size, each producing n varieties in similar amounts, but that country A consumes only half its income (O.5n if production of each firm is defined as one unit of income) and lends the other half to country B, which consumes 1 .5n. If indifference curves are homothetic (all varieties have unitary income elasticities), consumers in both countries will consume A and B goods in equal proportions. A trade surplus implies a greater share in world production than in world consumption, but the consumption proportions at home and abroad of home goods remain equal to shares in production. That finding is important because it predicts that the share of imports in consumption does not depend on the trade balance.
Some of the strong assumptions in this model can be relaxed without changing this finding. Increasing the number of countries does riot alter the conclusions. Countries may produce both differentiated and undifferentiated products and may differ in factor endowments.18 Production costs could also differ between countries. Assume, in the two-country model described above, that A products rise in price by 1 percent. If demand elasticities are the same worldwide, the share of A in demand should fall by the same percentage in both markets. Similarly, if the relative quality of products from A improves, both foreign and domestic buyers should raise their purchases by similar percentages. Each country could specialize fully in the production ofjust one variety. Again, shares in consumption in each country and in world production will correspond.
Three assumptions are, however, crucial for this result: similarity in tastes, absence of trade barriers, and zero transactions costs.19 If countries have a preference for goods made at home, shares of home goods in domestic consumption will exceed those of home goods in world production. Import barriers such as tariffs or quotas will raise the share of home goods in home consumption relative to their share in world production. Similarly, barriers against a country's exports will lead it to consume relatively large shares of its home production. If there are international transactions costs, home goods will be relatively cheaper in the domestic market and their share in domestic consumption could deviate from that in world production. 20 This analysis suggests that market shares can be explained by production shares, transportation and transactions costs, trade barriers, and taste differences: in the frictionless economy, the coefficient C would be zero, A would be 1.0, andB would be -1.0. In this case, if (Pij/Pi) is zero, the country does not produce the product, and (Mij/DUij) would be 1-all doinestic use would be imported. If (Pij/Pi) is unity, the country accounts for all global production, and (Mij/D Uij) would be zero-none of domestic use would be imported. In the real world, however, in the presence of frictions, transportation costs, and nonlinear relationships, coefficients will not equal unity. Nonetheless, the coefficients on both the distance and production shares variables are expected to be negative.
A SECOND SPECIFICATION
In the frictionless model outlined above, the shares of a country's products in its domestic market will equal its shares in the foreign market. Thus export shares in foreign consumption should equal the share of home goods in domestic consumption, and foreign market shares should offer an alternative method forjudging import shares. Indeed, this theory has some popular appeal. When the semiconductor industry in the United States argues that Japan follows discriminatory practices, its spokesmen point to the high shares of U.S. semiconductor products in the United States and other foreign markets in support of their case. Similarly, those defending Japan from allegations that it is discriminating against foreign goods point to Japanese success in foreign markets in electronics and motor vehicles as evidence that Japan simply makes better products. Again, differences in tastes, trade barriers, and transactions costs could influence the results.
This analysis suggests a second equation:
where X denotes exports, and FU denotes the use of i in countries other thanj.
IMPLEMENTATION
With a satisfactory proxy for international transactions costs, estimating equations la or 2 without explicit measures for Bij will capture the relationship typical of countries in the sample between imports and production shares (and export performance) inclusive of the impact of normal trade barriers and taste differences. A country dummy variable will not indicate the total impact of trade barriers and taste differences. It indicates the impact of only those trade barriers and taste differences that are unusual. A negative dummy variable indicates the aggregate impact of three kinds of unusual behavior: unusual preferences for domestic goods, abnormally high import barriers, and unusual foreign discrimination against the dummied country's exports.
For estimating equations la and 2, I exploit a data set that details national manufacturing production and trade between 1970 and 1983 for thirteen countries matched at a fairly disaggregated level, with the manufacturing sector divided into twenty-two industries.21 Domestic use (consumption plus investment) for each country in the sample is estimated using the formula a. The dependent variable is market share in each industry i for each country j, MVjIDUijQ where M is imports and DU is domestic use (consumption plus investment) computed using equation 3. Independent variables are distance, defined as the distance of each country's national economic center from its trading partners, weighted by shares in manufacturing production and domestic use; share in production in the world economy, defined as PjjIPi. The Japan dummy variable equals one for the case of Japan. All variables are in logarithms. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. generally significant coefficients, although it explains less variance (average R2 of 0.68) and has higher standard errors (average 43 percent). Negative coefficients on the Japanese dummy occur in sixteen of twentyone industries, with coefficients that are statistically significant in seven industries (electrical and nonelectrical machinery; motor vehicles; other transportation; stone, clay, and glass; rubber and plastics; and fabricated metals). This test suggests statistically unusual import behavior in products accounting for 20 percent of production.
The industry data have been pooled into single regressions, each with 273 observations, constraining the coefficients to be similar for all industries. These equations, reported in table 6 for different periods, have highly significant coefficients. The production shares specification explains about 60 percent of the sample variance, the export shares about 45 percent. The coefficients are relatively stable over time. In every case, the coefficient of the Japanese dummy is negative and significant. The typical value on the dummy variable (-0.60) in the production share specification indicates that Japanese import shares are unusually low by about 45 percent.
Data on the members of the European Community in the sample have A second set of summary equations examines aggregate manufactured imports, production, domestic use, and exports. As reported in table 8, these equations yield less precise coefficients but ones similar to those of the pooled disaggregated version. Japanese imports in the 1980 production shares specification were 40 percent lower than predicted. Table 9 reports the results of estimating the equations in tables 4 and 5 for different periods. The estimates of the Japanese dummies in these periods are similar. Table 10 reports the dummy variables on each other country in the sample when these variables are used in the pooled regressions. In the 1980 production share specification, only Finland and Japan underimported significantly.24 In the export share specification, the only two 24. The presence of significant country dummies could indicate heteroskedasticity. As Barbone notes, "This exercise is questionable on econometric grounds. The value of the dummy for each country is in fact to be understood as conditional on the hypothesis that other country dummies are not significantly different from zero, a hypothesis rejected by any other significant value." Barbone, "Is Japan an Underimporter?" significant underimporters were the United Kingdom and Japan, with the coefficient on the Japanese dummy twice that on the United Kingdom. Only Japan is an underimporter in both specifications.25
INTERPRETATION
These results reject the view that Japanese manufactured imports are not unusually low. They also indicate that the superior quality of Japanese 25. A peculiar overimporteris Australia, which is well known to have highly protective barriers on manufactured goods. The Australian dummy is the result of having Japan, a country of similar distance and much lower import shares, in the sample. When both Japanese and Australian dummies are introduced, however, the Australian observation is no longer significant. products cannot explain Japanese imports. Japanese export volumes are too small to justify Japan's high share of its home market. But the results leave some issues unresolved because they do not indicate the relative importance of export barriers, import barriers, and unusual buyer preferences.
Because, with the exception of Japanese textiles, Japanese exports were not subject to unusual barriers in 1970, it seems reasonable to interpret the 1970 dummy coefficients as reflecting unusual import behavior. The relative stability in the aggregate coefficients in the production share specification between 1970 and 1980 suggests that this behavior persisted. In some industries, though, an upward drift in the coefficients could reflect the imposition of export restraints. To interpret the coefficient on the dummy variables as a reflection of differences in preferences, we must assume that Japan has different tastes and displays an abnormal bias for home products. Since most countries in the sample have similar per capita GDP income levels, with none deviating more than 20 percent from the group mean, nonhomotheticity is an unlikely cause.26
SIMULATED IMPACT OF BARRIERS
How different would Japan's trade structure be if its import behavior were normal given its distance from other producers? The dummy variable coefficients can be used to provide a rough answer.
In 1980, Japanese manufactured goods imports and exports were valued at $31.5 billion and $126 billion, respectively. The coefficient in table 8 indicates that manufactured imports would have been higher in 1980 by 59 percent, or $18.6 billion, in the absence of unusual barriers. Initially, therefore, removing these barriers would reduce the manufactured goods trade surplus from $94.5 billion to $75.9 billion.
In response to a rise in imports, however, the yen would weaken. As implied by the equation system reported in table 11, to restore the current account to its former level (in yen) with GDP unchanged would require a real yen depreciation of about 10.5 percent.27 If this depreciation 26. Correlating the shares of twenty-two industries in Japanese production and domestic use with shares in the rest of the sample suggests nothing unusual about either Japanese production (correlation 0.91) or use (correlation 0.96).
27. Equations indicate elasticities with respect to the real exchange rate of -0.91 and 1.07 for exports and imports of goods and services, respectively. See table 11. 
Price Responsiveness
By examining the price responsiveness of Japanese imports, it may be possible to determine the nature of the barriers more precisely. Zero price elasticities would suggest quotas due to cartels and government policies such as administrative guidance and prohibitive regulations. Low (and nonlinear) price elasticities would suggest significant fixed costs due to entry barriers.30 Normal price elasticities, combined with evidence of underimporting, could indicate tariffs, inadequate competition in the distribution system,31 and unusual buyer preferences.32 Evidence on income elasticities is also useful. Zero price and income elasticities could indicate fixed quotas. Normal income elasticities and zero price elasticities would suggest quotas set in terms of market share rather than in fixed quantities. 31. Monopolists set prices equal to marginal cost plus a markup equal to (1 + l/ed), where ed is the elasticity of demand. If competition to distribute imported products is weak, markups will be high, but lower import prices will be reflected in lower consumer prices. While higher markups reduce the quantity sold, they resemble tariffs (if ed is constant) and will not affect responsiveness to price changes.
32. If the utility function (U) is Cobb-Douglas, for example, so that log U equals Aljog H and (1 -AI) log I, where H is the domestic good, and I the imported good and Al > (1 -Al), the share of income spent on home goods will always be higher than that spent on domestic goods, but both would have unitary price and income elasticities. When the time trends are taken into account, Japanese income elasticities are generally between a quarter and a third those of the United States. This difference is somewhat larger than might be expected from those countries' growth rates. Between 1970 and 1985, Japanese industrial production increased at a 4.5 percent rate, as against 2.7 percent for the United States and 2.6 percent for all industrial countries. Table 14 reports similar regressions for aggregate manufacturing imports in Japan, the United States, Italy, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. The equation for Japan gives results similar to the disaggregated version. Indeed, the unitary import price elasticity is fairly close to the weighted average of price elasticities from the disaggregated equations.36 This Japanese import price elasticity lies in the middle of the estimates in table 13.
In sum, therefore, the barriers that inhibit Japanese imports do not, in most cases, prevent fairly normal price responses. These barriers are thus probably limitations in the distribution system and differences in buyer preferences, a conclusion supported by Christelow's finding that the distribution system marks up imports differentially.37 
Conclusions
Japanese trade runs into protectionist constraints more frequently than that of other countries, in part because of Japan's unusual trade structure, especially the small value of manufactured goods imports. Overwhelmingly, such imports are low because Japan has a comparative advantage in producing manufactured goods and because it is distant from its trading partners. In addition, however, peculiar features of Japanese trade reduce manufactured imports by a substantial percentage, but a relatively small absolute value.
In 1980, for example, as equations in this study indicate, unusual barriers and preferences reduced Japanese manufactured goods imports about 40 percent. The removal of such barriers would have increased the value of Japanese manufactured imports about $13 billion dollars and lowered Japan's trade surplus in manufactured goods about $16 billion, or some 17 percent. Japan would have considerably more intraindustry trade.
With the exception of basic metals, food, clothing, and textiles, Japanese imports of manufactured goods are fairly responsive to relative price changes. This price responsiveness suggests that the abnormally low level of manufactured imports is due to unofficial impediments such as unusual buyer preferences and lack of competitiveness in the distribution system. To be able to export freely, Japan needs to improve its international political environment, open its domestic market, and restructure its trade.
Two complementary elements in such restructuring would be a stronger yen supported by an easier Japanese fiscal policy. Japan could temporarily lower its national saving rate by fiscal measures and initiate a period of lower current account surpluses. Because imports are responsive to relative price changes, manufactured goods imports would increase significantly.
A period of a strong yen could have irreversible effects. Foreigners would establish distribution networks and alter distribution structures, enabling them to hold on to markets even if the yen should reverse itself. And Japanese producers would sink costs into assembly operations abroad to service the domestic market.
But even with the yen above current levels, the Japanese market is likely to remain relatively closed, and the tensions from the unusual intangible barriers to imports are likely to continue. Although import barriers may not have a major impact on the Japanese manufactured goods trade surplus, it is still urgent to remove them. Indeed, Japan cannot afford to have such barriers because its fundamental structure, its need to run large manufactured goods trade surpluses, makes it vulnerable to political pressures.
It often seems expedient, in the face of foreign protectionist pressures, for Japan to limit exports rather than increase imports. But such a response does nothing to create a sustainable structure for the future. Indeed, by avoiding domestic adjustment, it has increased pressures over the long run. Ultimately, a sustainable structure requires an open domestic market. Accordingly, simply allowing the currency to appreciate may not be sufficient.45 Japan should take active measures to 45 . The welfare implications of opening Japan's economy through a strong yen, which improves Japan's terms of trade, might be quite different from removing import barriers, which would worsen them. increase the competitiveness of its distribution system and to avoid administrative guidance and selective government procurement practices. 46 A final consideration has to do with Japan's agricultural trade. If Japan removes agricultural trade barriers, whose existence is not a matter of dispute, and increases its agricultural imports, it will have to shift its spending patterns or, more likely, export more manufactured goods to pay for the imports. Creating a favorable environment for these exports by enhancing two-way trade should be a major policy objective. 
Comments and Discussion
Paul Krugman: Robert Lawrence has produced an important paperone that offers the seal of approval of the economics establishment to the charge that Japan's markets for manufactures are tacitly closed to imports. His conclusion is that Japan imports about 40 percent fewer manufactures than it would if its markets were as open as those of the average non-Japanese OECD country. That is, with freed markets it would import about 80 percent more. Given the imprecision necessarily involved, let's round it up and say that Japan might, if it would only open its markets, double its manufactures imports. We realize immediately that the paper is saying something very explosive. Let me say at the start that I believe that Lawrence is very probably right, although some of the methods used are a little shaky. I am much less certain about the political economy offered here, which prescribes trade liberalization as the answer to Japan's worsening relations with its trading partners. Before I turn to this question, however, let me review the logic of the economic analysis.
The basic piece of evidence on which the conclusions rest is the estimation of a number of import equations based on a differentiatedproducts model of trade in manufactured goods. Flatteringly, the paper offers this approach as one based on the monopolistic competition models of trade volume developed by Elhanan Helpman and me. However, Lawrence extrapolates considerably from the highly stylized analysis that Helpman and I offered. We used the assumption of zero transport costs as a fundamental simplifying device; Lawrence, because he is interested in reality, is obliged to modify that approach to take transportation costs into account. Now the step from the no-transport-cost theoretical model to the realistic transport-cost-inclusive empirical model is not a rigorous one.
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In fact, as anyone who has worked on the problem knows, it is very difficult to derive a tractable multicountry model of the volume of trade in the presence of transport costs. This task is hard in conventional models; it is if anything harder when we allow for increasing returns, because there are all kinds of complicating effects that arise from the fact that countries with large domestic markets tend to be favored locations for industries subject to large economies of scale. So the equations estimated here are inspired by the Helpman-Krugman model rather than derived from it.
What makes this worrisome is that the role of transport costs is crucial in assessing Japan's openness to imports. Japan is the only resourcepoor advanced country not in Europe, and the only large industrial nation with no industrial neighbors. We need to answer whether the geographical isolation of Japan is enough to explain its low share of imported manufactures, yet we lack a really well-specified model that lets us assess this issue. The Lawrence paper has what I think is a more plausible test that makes better use of the available data than any other effort to date, but even it is not completely satisfying because the empirical result is not firmly grounded in theory.
In spite of this unease, I agree that the rough estimate that Japan should be importing about twice as many manufactures as it does is plausible. Let me offer two less formal pieces of evidence that seem to support this. First, suppose we compare Japanese imports of manufactures with the "nonlocal" manufactures imports of the United States and the European Community. In 1984 the United States imported manufactures from sources other than Canada equal to 4.8 percent of GNP; the EC imported non-EC manufactures equal to 6.5 percent of GNP; Japan's manufactures imports were only 2.9 percent of GNP. Admittedly, Japan is poorer in resources than either the EC or the United States, which should show up in lower manufactures imports as well as higher exports; but Japan is also smaller than the other two economic units, which would lead us to expect a higher import share. So it would not be unreasonable to expect Japan to have a manufactures import share comparable to that of the EC, which would indeed involve a doubling of those imports.
Second, compare U.S. trade with Japan and that with Germany. As Lawrence points out, Germany and Japan are virtual twins in their net trade patterns. In 1984, however, U.S. manufactures exports to Germany were 45 percent of U.S. imports, whereas U.S. manufactures exports to Japan were only 23 percent of U. S. imports. Once again, one can suppose that if the Japanese were as well behaved as the Germans their import share would roughly double.
Let me now turn to the problem of political economy. Suppose we accept that Japan should be importing twice as many manufactures as it now does. What we conclude from this depends critically on two questions, one of which the paper does not answer, the other of which it answers in a way that I find implausible.
The question the paper fails to answer is why Japan imports less than it should. At the beginning of the paper two alternative hypotheses are offered: tacit government policy or the "invisible handshake" of Japan's cartelized industrial structure. It makes a tremendous difference which of these you believe is the truth. If government policy is the villain, then all a liberal-minded Japanese government needs to do is reform itself. Japan's economic glasnost might be hard to sell to its bureaucrats, but we might have some hope that forceful leadership could change the situation quickly. If the problem is instead rooted in industrial structure, then the government presumably would have to engage in a long-term program of antitrust and moral suasion to bring down the barriers. The paper gives us no clue as to which story is the right one, and thus as to how patient Japan's trade partners will have to be. My reading of the anecdotal evidence is that industrial structure is unfortunately very important in the closure of Japan's markets, and thus that even with the best will Japan's government cannot deliver trade liberalization at all rapidly.
The 8.96 million yen question, however, is whether opening of Japanese markets would really ease trade frictions. Here I just do not agree with the paper's premise. What Lawrence does is to compare Japan with Germany, which runs a manufactures trade surplus as large relative to GNP as Japan's, but with seven times as large an import share-and which excites little hostility from the United States. However, even a liberal Japan would not look like Germany-it would still, on the paper's estimate, export three times as much in the way of manufactures as it imports, essentially because Japan is not in the middle of Europe. Furthermore, I cannot believe that lack of friction with Germany can be explained by German manufactures imports. Recall that most of the intra-industry trade of Germany is within Europe. The United States sells Germany only 45 cents' worth of manufactures for every dollar it buys, as compared with Japan's 23 cents. Is it really plausible that the difference in popular perception can be attributed to the fact that the voice of the worker who loses his job to German competition is drowned out by the voices of 0.45 exporters, while his colleague who lost out to Japanese competition has only 0.23 exporters to argue with? I am not convinced.
My own alternative hypothesis is that conflict with Japan is due primarily to a different aspect of its trade performance-the rapid growth of Japanese exports and the rising Japanese market share. Unlike the Germans, the Japanese keep invading new markets that the United States regards as its private preserves. My guess is that this creates tension for both rational reasons, such as the problem of adjustment to increased competition, and irrational ones, such as fear and envy. Of course this is a very pessimistic diagnosis, since it says that the only way for Japan to have more friends is to be less successful. We can only hope that the paper is right, and that a liberal Japan would be able to run current account surpluses in peace. I just wouldn't count on it. William Brainard elaborated on Paul Krugman's remark in his formal comment on the paper that the strong conclusions of the HelpmanKrugman model need not apply once transportation costs are introduced. In the presence of such costs, the cross-price elasticities at the product level would be crucial in determining import and export shares. If goods were close substitutes, even minor transportation costs would dominate trade patterns. He therefore questioned whether the regression results presented by Lawrence, even though they allow for transportation costs, provide a test of the Helpman-Krugman model and whether they can identify departures from normal patterns of imports and exports in the presence of transportation costs. Accepting Lawrence's verdict that Japan spent relatively less on imported manufactured goods than other industrial countries, Brainard reasoned that the paper had not persuasively demonstrated why this was so. In the same vein, Lawrence Summers emphasized that Lawrence's statistical analysis did not provide proof of "trade barriers" in Japan. The low level of imports could be explained by differences in tastes, language, and geographic location.
General
Marcus Noland questioned whether Lawrence's results demonstrate any greater Japanese import restriction than have previous studies. For example, the study by Bergsten and Cline that Lawrence cites concludes that Japan does not have above-normal protection. Adjusting the Bergsten-Cline estimates to make them apply to total Japanese trade implies that Japan's import restrictiveness is in the range of $7 billion to $15 billion, which is in Lawrence's range. Noland also questioned the author's reliance on expansionary fiscal policy in Japan to help reduce the trade surplus. He noted that estimates of that effect are small relative to the magnitude of Japan's trade surplus, both globally and with the United States. An analysis by the Bank of Japan concluded that over a two-year period, the government's recently announced plan to provide a $6 trillion yen stimulus package would lower the total Japanese trade surplus by $3 billion to $3.5 billion and lower the bilateral surplus with the United States by about $1 billion. Noland's own estimates were somewhat higher in the first case and around $1.3 billion in the second case. Given such small effects of a fiscal stimulus, Noland concluded that significant reduction of the trade surplus would occur only if a high yen changes the structural features of the Japanese economy, such as the distribution system, that hamper trade.
Charles Schultze questioned whether an increase in intra-industry trade would shield Japan from protectionist measures, as Lawrence hoped. In his view, efforts to obtain protection are not organized along broad industry lines, but rather arise from competitive fears of producers representing fairly specific product categories. Greater intra-industry trade, as measured using SIC codes, would not remove these political pressures to stem foreign competition.
